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Abstract   
The demand for law on the part of the society (business, middle class, civil society) is 
QRWVXI¿FLHQWDWWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVWDJH²WKHUHFLSURFDOGHPDQGIRUODZIURPWKHSRZHU
elite is necessary. Contemporary theory states that in the contrary case the pressure on 
elites would require a more open regime of participation. In order to strengthen the posi-
tions of the power elite in the long-run it is necessary to limit endless redistribution of 
assets and introduce the common rule for all. 
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
reserved.
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ P26, P48.
.H\ZRUGV elite, demand for law, rule of law.
1. Introduction
Under the “overcrowded streetcar (tram) effect” in everyday life, we under-
VWDQG WKHZHOONQRZQUXVKKRXUVLWXDWLRQDFURZGRISDVVHQJHUV LVDWWHPSWLQJ
WRGHOD\WKHGHSDUWLQJWUDPDQGVTXHH]HWKURXJKWKHGRRUV+RZHYHUDVVRRQDV
DSDVVHQJHULVLQVLGHWKHOXFN\ULGHU¶VREMHFWLYHDQGVXEMHFWLYHSHUFHSWLRQRILW
change dramatically. Now, he is impatient for the doors to close and the tram to 
depart the station. In certain cases, the passengers begin to hurry the driver: do 
not wait for all to board; close the doors and drive off.1 These diverging interests 
RIWKHYHU\VDPHDFWRUVGH¿QHGRQORFDWLRQHLWKHULQVLGHRURXWVLGHWKHVWUHHWFDU
   ً  The updated English version of the article published in Russian in Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2012, No. 6, pp. 33–47. 
The journal version of the report at the 13th Leontieff Readings (St. Petersburg, February 2012).
  E-mail address: lgrigor1@yandex.ru. 
  3HHUUHYLHZXQGHUUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL
 1 This picture can be viewed at any streetcar stop in Moscow.
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 appear to be a possible model for how interest groups, including the new elite, 
evaluate their own position and the elites’ demand for law.
Generally, for centuries, the demand for law was formed through the practi-
FDODFWLRQVRIKXPDQLW\,QWKLVZRUNZHVKDOOQRWFRQVLGHUKRZVRFLDOUHODWLRQ-
ships are formed or how the social contract is implemented through a complex 
evolution of laws, informal relations, violations and reorganizations. It is suf-
¿FLHQWWRVWDWHWKDWIRUDGHYHORSHGGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\WKHUXOHRIODZLVQDWXUDO
and enforced by the entire system of coercion. In these circumstances, the law 
is changed in the political competitive process, and the winner is the one who is 
DEOHWRJDLQWKHXSSHUKDQGLQDQHOHFWLRQRULQDFRXUWRIODZ7KHODZEUHDNHU
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHRQHZKREUHDNVEDVLFODZVLVHIIHFWLYHO\SXQLVKHGZKHQH[SRVHG
DQGFDXJKW2QHH[DPSOHLVWKHUHFHQW%HUQDUG0DGRIIDIIDLU0DGRIIRYHUVDZ
the largest Ponzi scheme in the U.S. history, which resulted in a total loss of over 
50 billion dollars.
In a democratic discussion of the legislation, the dispute usually unfolds over 
FKDQJHVWKDWDUHEHQH¿FLDO WRFHUWDLQ LQWHUHVWJURXSV7KHZLQQHUV¶VROXWLRQLQ-
cludes the creation of rules for everyone, including themselves. In other words, 
the winners’ victory in this competitive situation is acceptable to the others as 
a general rule. In Muslim societies, for example, violations of normal democratic 
‘constitutions and corruption’ triggered the demand by broad masses of the poor 
for sharia law, which provides hope for justice.
This occurrence highlights the importance of the question: who generates 
the demand for law? Which social class? There is minimal doubt that the demand 
for effective criminal laws is universal; however, the interpretations of the ap-
proaches to law by the bureaucracy and businesses in Russia are highly different 
VHH=KXLNRYHWDO'LIIHUHQWLQWHUHVWVGHWHUPLQHWKHGHPDQGIRUVSHFL¿F
OHJDO SURYLVLRQV$GGLWLRQDOO\ LQ DQ HVWDEOLVKHG VWDEOH V\VWHP RI LQVWLWXWLRQV
(both formal and informal), we are confronted not with demand in general but 
ZLWKGHPDQGE\LQWHUHVWJURXSVIRUVSHFL¿FHOHPHQWV
These general provisions are the starting point of any analysis of law, includ-
ing its compliance with the public interest, that is, as evaluated by the actual bar-
JDLQLQJSRZHURIYDULRXVLQWHUHVWJURXSV2XUWDVNLVDWWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQRIWKHWZR
SUREOHPVHDFKRIZKLFKLVGLI¿FXOWWRVROYH)LUVWZHLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUROHRIHOLWHV
in the demand for law, and second, we examine the formation of such a demand 
in periods of profound social transformation.
2. The elites and demand for law
In considering the demand of the elites for law, we maintain that this issue 
is not a question of politics but a fundamental problem of political economy. 
Narrowing the scope of analysis, the actor in need of law, to the elite does not 
VLPSOLI\RXUWDVNIRUVHYHUDOUHDVRQV
First, the composition of a particular elite is not always clear; therefore, 
the question is relevant when there is consensus among its groups. Second, 
the interests of the elite are not necessarily stable and may (as with those of other 
groups and strata) evolve over time. Third, how the process of reproduction of 
HOLWHVLQYDULRXVFRQGLWLRQVZRUNVLVRIWHQXQFOHDUZKLFKLVSDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQW
for the “overcrowded streetcar effect.”
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)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVSDSHUZHVKDOOOLPLWWKHWDVNRIUHVHDUFKWRLVVXHVRI
ownership and demand (by the governing (ruling) elite) for sustainable law in 
WKLVDUHDVHH+LJOH\DQG%XUWRQ:HXQGHUVWDQGWKLVHOLWHLQWKHPDQQHU
WKDW:0LOOVGLGDVDQDVVRFLDWLRQRISROLWLFDODQG¿QDQFLDOHOLWHV7KHODWWHU
LQRXUYLHZ LV WKHWRS WLHURI WKHXSSHUFODVVZKLFKPDNHV WKHPRVW LPSRUWDQW
HFRQRPLFGHFLVLRQVDQGUHWDLQVGLUHFWRU LQGLUHFWFRQWURORYHUNH\DVVHWV ZLWK
allowances for collective forms of ownership and the dispersion of ownership).
:LWK WKHVHVLPSOL¿FDWLRQV WKHSULPDU\ LVVXH LV WKHXQLW\RI WKHHOLWH LQ IRU-
PXODWLQJWKHSUREOHPRIODZDQGLWVVWDELOLW\TXDOLW\DQGVXSUHPDF\$GLYLGHG
elite cannot effectively implement positive programs because (in the form of 
VHSDUDWHJURXSVLWLVLQDVWDWHRI¿JKWIRUVXUYLYDORUH[LVWHQFH,QWKLVVWXG\
we proceed from the simple idea that the elites, in contrast to all (or most) other 
groups, not only have a positive program but, at the same time, are concerned 
with the preservation of their status; elites analyze the impact of changes within 
institutions and politics on their dominant position and the interrelation among 
the elite groups’ positions.
The most important practical conclusion in connection with such duality is 
the following: the elites, in principle, do not operate on the basis of pure ratio-
nality. The elites are forced to constantly monitor (or are interested in doing so) 
the impact of events and the proposed laws on their position. Changes in the po-
sition of other strata in a volatile legal environment are impersonal in nature 
and are often not entirely obvious to the objects of law. Many social strata are 
unable to adequately analyze the dynamics of the situation to anticipate events 
and their consequences. Conversely, the elites are perfectly aware (not in terms 
of the accuracy of estimates, but of attention to and perception of the context) 
RI WKHVLWXDWLRQDQGKDYH WKHPHDQV WRPRQLWRUDQDO\]H LQÀXHQFHDQGSUHYHQW
adverse effects.
Let us note an important aspect of the evolution of the elite’s interests, that 
RI FRQVROLGDWLQJ FRQWURO DQG SUHYHQWLQJ FRQÀLFWV RYHU WKHIXQGDPHQWDO LVVXHV
of property rights. The struggle for property is one thing, and its legitimiza-
tion is something entirely different. The rules governing elite’s reproduction are 
WKHNH\TXHVWLRQ LQ DQ\FRPPXQLW\ ,Q HVWDEOLVKHGGHPRFUDFLHV WKLVSUREOHP
was not always as easily solved as in the recent past. Roosevelt’s amendments 
WRWKHODZRQLQKHULWDQFHOHGWRKXJHFKDQJHVLQWKHUHSURGXFWLRQRIWKH¿QDQFLDO
HOLWH,QWKHODVWGHFDGHLQFRXQWULHVZLWKGHYHORSHGPDUNHWHFRQRPLHVFULWLFLVP
RIFRUSRUDWHPDQDJHPHQWH[FHVVLYHERQXVHVDQGODFNRIFRPSDQ\RZQHUV¶DQG
management’s responsibility led to lawsuits, as well as to a drastic tightening 
of regulation and supervision. Under pressures from the political elite and civil 
VRFLHW\WKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH¿QDQFLDOHOLWHKDVEHHQFKDQJLQJQRWDEO\DOWKRXJK
QRW UDGLFDOO\ +RZHYHU WKHUXOHV RI LQKHULWDQFH EDQNUXSWF\ PHUJHUV DQG
 acquisitions, control and change of control are not undergoing systemic changes, 
not as of yet.
Regarding history, which has been popular with the economists in recent 
years, we can state that if the ruling elite loses its control of society and property 
(as a result of lost wars and revolutions), the question arises regarding the rules 
governing the redistribution (seizure) of property and the recognition of control 
DQGPDQDJHPHQWULJKWVWKDWRSHQVWKHZD\IRULWVXVHDQGSRVVHVVLRQ+LVWRULFDO
examples and M. Olson’s approach point to the importance of a transition from 
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the initial chaos of ownership relations, the instability of forms, and the scope 
DQGUDWHVRIVNLPPLQJWKHSURGXFHUV¶FXUUHQWLQFRPHVWRDVWDWLRQDU\RSHUDWLRQ
of resources.2$SSDUHQWO\ RQH FDQ VLQJOHRXW WKHUHFXUUHQFH ZLWKJUHDW DFWXDO
diversity) of several interrelated steps: seizure of the ownership of a resource (in 
WKHFDVHRID³URYLQJEDQGLW´WKLVLVWKHVROHDQGVXI¿FLHQWFRQGLWLRQIRULWVXVH
assertion of the control over ownership of the resource, legitimization of control 
(ownership), transition to stationary control and management on the basis of 
a  legitimate ownership of the resource.
%HIRUHWXUQLQJWRPRUHVSHFL¿FUHVHDUFKRQFRQWHPSRUDU\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQSURE-
OHPVZH VKRXOGQRWH WKHWKRURXJKDQDO\VLV FRQGXFWHGE\'1RUWK':DOOLV
DQG%:HLQJDVWUHJDUGLQJZKDWD³VWDWLRQDU\EDQGLW´DFWXDOO\LV,QGHHG
the elites should be interested in achieving stable public order; however, as politi-
cians state, they need to achieve a “preliminary arrangement.” North et al. (2009) 
FDOOWKLVDUUDQJHPHQWGH¿QLQJUHFRJQL]LQJWKHLUSULYLOHJHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRRQH
DQRWKHU ³«,QLWLDOO\ WKHVH SULYLOHJHV DUHÀXLG UHVXOWLQJ IURP WKHG\QDPLFV RI
the coalition… Legal systems initially develop to enforce unique and personal 
HOLWHSULYLOHJHV´$IHZFKDOOHQJLQJLVVXHVUHPDLQLQWKHVRFLHWDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
process, particularly from a practical perspective. First, one challenging ques-
tion is whether the elites realize the need for the mutual recognition of privileges, 
a certain compromise that allows them to predict their partners’ behavior, reduc-
ing the costs of confrontation or an “arms race”, with the goal being to achieve 
general stability for the elites. Given that the seizure of property is usually ac-
companied by the violation of certain (old) legal norms, a problem arises with 
WKH³OHJDODPQHVW\RIWKHHOLWHZLWKUHVSHFWWRLWVHOI´QHHGHGWRPDNHWKHWUDQVL-
tion to new legal norms. Moreover, a change in legal norms is generally easier 
to legitimize than a massive redistribution of property that affects the interests 
of certain social strata, or at least, those strata believe their interests will be af-
IHFWHG)LQDOO\ZKHQVSHDNLQJRIUHFRJQL]LQJWKHPXWXDOSULYLOHJHVRIWKHHOLWHV
we imply that the elites realize very well who they should and should not admit 
into a coalition. In reality, our assertions follow from the multiplicity of the elites. 
7KHHOLWHV¿QGLWGLI¿FXOWWRGH¿QHODZVDWDQ\JLYHQPRPHQWUHVXOWLQJLQWKHLP-
portance of an individual leader), whereas the process of mutual recognition may 
be complex, interruptive, unstable, and accompanied by coalitions; this compels 
elites to achieve equilibrium at a given point in time.
3. Institution building in periods of deep social change 
+LVWRULFDOO\ZHNQRZODUJHVFDOHH[DPSOHVRI OHJDOV\VWHPV WKDWKDYHEHHQ
transferred into new states and continents from the outside. The Norman  conquest 
of England in the XI century changed the system of law, causing an enormous 
LPSDFWRQWKHZRUOG7KH0RQJROLDQDQG7XUNLVKFRQTXHVWVZHUHDFFRPSDQLHG
E\ WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW RI QHZ OHJDO FRGHV WKHFRORQL]DWLRQ RI$PHULFD DQG WHU-
ritories on other continents was accompanied by the introduction of English and 
 2 “Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and 
SURGXFHOHDYLQJPLQLPDOIRUHLWKHUWKHSRSXODWLRQRUWKHEDQGLWV%RWKFDQEHEHWWHURIILIDEDQGLWVHWVKLPVHOI
XSDVDGLFWDWRU² a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes.” (Olson, 
1993, p. 567). 
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Spanish law. These examples are, of course, simpler in certain ways: the win-
ner establishes its own rules. The emancipation of the serfs in Russia in 1861 
was also a part of the historical experience. We observed something similar, 
although with smaller changes to the basic institutions, after the end of World 
War II in Japan and Germany and later in South Korea. These people experien-
FHGODUJHVFDOHWUDQVSODQWDWLRQRI$QJOR6D[RQHOHPHQWVDQGDIUDJPHQWDWLRQRI
owner ship. Nevertheless, the Japanese and German cultures, coupled with his-
torically inherited institutions, led to hybrids that were adapted to the conditions 
RI WKHVH FRXQWULHV+HQFH WKHV\VWHP RI ODUJH -DSDQHVH DQG.RUHDQ SDWHUQD
listic) companies, which are conquering the world; hence the special funds to 
VXSSRUWSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV6WLIWXQJLQ*HUPDQ\+\EULGL]DWLRQRFFXUVDSSDUHQWO\
WKURXJK WKHLQWHUDFWLRQRI WZR³VWURQJ´V\VWHPVRI LQVWLWXWLRQV$QH[DPSOHRI
creating anew the institution of property in the radical form was shown, perhaps, 
by the Soviet regime, with its planned economy during the socialist experiment; 
this began with the 1917 October Revolution and lasted until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. The socialization of income in China had deep histori-
cal roots and was not very different from the previous regime.
In all these cases, new systems were designed by the “reformer,” which we 
understand to be a group of persons or a body (usually, informal) that produces 
a system of new institutions on behalf of new authorities. The latter, logical-
O\DUHHLWKHUDFRORQLDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQSOXVFHUWDLQ¿JXUHVWKDWHQVXUHWKHSUH
vious local institutions are accounted for, or representatives of a new elite, who 
form for themselves and for the society a system of new formal institutions. To 
a certain degree, the “reformer” discards the old institutions, forms new ones 
and attempts to entice them to match the system, deliberately (at best) or uncon-
sciously.3,WLVQRWHZRUWK\WKDWWKH³UHIRUPHU´DVDJURXSRISHRSOHZRUNLQJRQ
the content of the reforms belongs mostly to the intellectual elite. The “ reformer” 
UDUHO\KDVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQFKRRVLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVDOWKRXJK
such short periods may occur and have occurred in different countries); this is 
the prerogative of the new power elite, emerging “from the foam of transforma-
WLRQ´+RZHYHUWKH³UHIRUPHU´FDQQRWE\LWVHOIVROYHWKHFRPSOH[LVVXHRILQ-
stitutions; in our view, it is split into the proxy of the “ reformer”, who is visible 
and transparent, and the “principal”, who is an actor or a group participating 
LQWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVV$WWKHVWDUWRIWKHUHIRUPVWKHLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQV
( regarding the nature of institutions, privatization, and liberalization) are of 
DUELWUDU\FKDUDFWHU7KHUHLV\HWQRODZWKDWHQDEOHVPDNLQJOHJLWLPDWHGHFLVLRQV
5HYROXWLRQDULHVRUZLQQHUVLQWKHZDUWDNH³IRUFLEOH´QRWLQWHUPVRIPHWKRGV
EXWLQIDFWGHFLVLRQVUHJDUGLQJZKDWVRFLHW\ZLOOEHOLNHDQGKRZSURSHUW\ZLOO
be transformed.
The problem of institutional design in the process of transformation is an 
important element of any reform. To an outsider, it may appear haphazard, 
ZKLFK UDLVHV LWV VRFLDO FRVWV FDXVHV ÀXFWXDWLRQV LQ IRUPXODWLQJ JRDOV EUHDNV
methods , and results in discrepancy between the expected and actual results 
 3 7KHGHJUHH RI WKHUHIRUPHUV¶ DZDUHQHVV RI WKHHVVHQFH DQG WKH ¿QDO JRDO RI WKHLU DFWLYLW\ WKHHVVHQFH RI
institutional design, its tools, social costs and social responsibility is a subject matter of separate research, both 
KLVWRULFDODQGWKHRUHWLFDO7KLVERLOVGRZQWRDQVZHULQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQKDGWKH³UHIRUPHU´KDGSULRUNQRZOHGJHRI
WKHVRFLDOFRVWVDQGWKHVLGHHIIHFWVRIKLVDFWLYLW\DQGWKHULVNRIIDLOXUHDQGLIQRWZKDWZHUHKLVDFWLRQVEDVHGRQ"
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(see Tambovtsev, 1997). In periods of transformation, institutions emerge under 
WKHLQÀXHQFHRIERWKWKHSUDFWLFDOFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLW\RIHFRQRPLFDJHQWVDQGRI
the activity of the “reformer.” We have previously stated that there is no vacuum 
in the institutional design from below, or absorption (refer to the perspective later 
expressed by S. Pejovich) of experience by institutions; that is, there can be no 
pause between the creation of institutions and their consolidation in legal acts 
(Grigoryev, 2013). 
,QKLVERRN³(OHPHQWVRIWKHWKHRU\RIUHIRUPV´DFDGHPLFLDQ903ROWHURYLFK
rightly states that “the accumulation of seemingly positive changes can lead to 
LQHI¿FLHQWLQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHV7KHVHFRQGW\SHRIWUDMHFWRU\LVWKHUHVXOWRI
deliberate institution-building, it is typical for the reforms carried out by organi-
zations and, in particular, by the state.” It would be useful to once again discuss 
WKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQVFDQNQRZWKHSUHIHUUHGDSSURDFKWRGHVLJQ-
LQJ+RZHYHUDV WKHDXWKRUFRQFOXGHV³QDWXUDOVHOHFWLRQDQGUHIRUPVFRPSOH-
ment each other” (Polterovich, 2007, pp. 54–55). Let us note that the doer of 
the reform remains slightly vague, but very benevolent.
:HRIIHUDIDLUO\VLPSOHWKHVLV7KH¿QDOFKRLFHVHOHFWLRQRILQVWLWXWLRQVLQ
real life, to be chosen for the legal system during the transformation and for a yet-
to-be planned reform, is made by the “reformer.” Regardless of the form of orga-
QL]DWLRQZKHWKHULWLVDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRPPLVVLRQDWKLQNWDQNRUDJURXSRIDG-
YLVHUVVXFKDERG\¿OWHUVDOONQRZOHGJHRILWVRZQUHJDUGLQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ
the surrounding world, generates solutions and presents them to the “principal” 
DVWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHUHDOSRZHUDWWKHPRPHQWRIWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
From our perspective, “the seizure of power” by this or that elite occurs suf-
¿FLHQWO\HDUO\WKHPDQQHULQZKLFKIRUHLJQLQYDVLRQVRFFXUUHGLQKLVWRU\WKHUH-
IRUH WKHGHVLJQZRUN WKHVHOHFWLRQRI H[WHUQDO H[SHULHQFH DQG WKHDQDO\VLVRI
their own practices can be conducted with due regard for the “tastes and inte-
UHVWV´RIWKHQHZUXOLQJHOLWH7KHODWWHUPD\EHZHDNDQGLJQRUDQWRUYHU\VWURQJ
DQG SXUSRVHIXO ERWK KDYH RFFXUUHG EXW XVXDOO\ DUH VXI¿FLHQWO\ VPDUW WR DV-
sess its interests and preferences in the short term. Of course, the new govern-
ment (elite) portrays them as public goods and development goals, regardless of 
ZKHWKHULWEHOLHYHVWKLVZKLFKWKHFRQWHPSRUDULHV¿QGYHU\GLI¿FXOWWRYHULI\
DQGZKHWKHULWWUXO\NQRZVWKHPHDQVWRDFKLHYHVXFKVLJQL¿FDQWDQGORQJWHUP
goals. The elite always understands its interests!
The “reformer” in our case is a function (largely constant until the completion 
of reforms), which is performed by an agent of the authorities, not the autho-
ULWLHV WKHPVHOYHV LW FRQGXFWV WKHSURFHVV RI GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ ODUJHO\ GHWHU-
mines the choice of the type of institutions to be created, and corrects the cur-
rent policy and evaluates its results.) The decisive choice is to be made by those 
ZKRUHSUHVHQWUHDOSRZHUWKH³SULQFLSDO´VXFKDV(PSHURU$OH[DQGHU,,ZKR
was behind the commission for the reform of serfdom (see Gaman-Golutvina, 
 ,Q RXU RSLQLRQ WKLV DVSHFW LV RIWHQ RYHUORRNHG LQ DQDO\]LQJ WKHWUDQV-
formation of the former Soviet Union, in which the reformers are said to have 
DFWHGIRUWKHVDNHRIFHUWDLQIDLUO\DEVWUDFWSXEOLFLQWHUHVWDQGWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
DPDUNHWHFRQRP\DQGGHPRFUDF\7KLVDVSHFWLVSUHFLVHO\ZKDWWKHVORJDQVLQ
all post-Soviet countries proclaimed; however, very different things were under-
WDNHQWKHUHGLIIHUHQWLQVWLWXWLRQVZHUHIRUPHGDQGRIWHQWKH¿QDOUHVXOWVZHUH
the  opposite.
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The adoption of various provisions by a society’s elite in the transformation 
SKDVH LV D FRPSOH[ SURFHVV /RRNLQJ DKHDGZH VKRXOG UHFDOO WKDW HYHU\ HOLWH
is comprised of clans and groups. The relationship between the political and 
¿QDQFLDORZQHUVHOLWHVDUHUDUHO\VLPSOH-DQH$XVWHQ¶V0U'DUF\LVPRVWOLNHO\
WKHVROH H[FHSWLRQ7KHFRQÀLFWV EHWZHHQ WKHHOLWHV JUHDWO\ FRPSOLFDWH WKHWDVN
of formulating the objectives and methods of reform, the creation of a system of 
SROLWLFDOFKHFNVDQGEDODQFHVDQGWKHDFFRPPRGDWLRQRIWKHLQWHUHVWVRISURSHUW\
owners in the long run (see Gaman-Golutvina, 2001). This problem was recently 
LQWKHVWHUPHGLQWKHVFLHQWL¿FOLWHUDWXUHDV³HOLWHVHWWOHPHQWV´ %XUWRQDQG
+LJOH\
4. On the legitimacy of ownership
The legitimacy of ownership provides a basis for investment and sustainable 
economic development. The question of legitimacy of control and ownership 
FDQEHFRQVLGHUHGNH\LQWHUPVRIWKHFRPSOHWLRQRIDQ\ODUJHVFDOHWUDQVIRUPD-
tional process involving a fundamental change of the entire ownership system or 
WKHV\VWHPLFUHSODFHPHQWRIRZQHUV7KHWDVNRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLVWRFUHDWHSROLWL-
cal and economic institutions that ensure not only a type of economic growth, but 
dynamic development and the competitiveness of institutions in today’s highly 
FRPSHWLWLYHZRUOG2I FRXUVH LQ JHQHUDO WKHHOLWHZLOO VHHN WR OHJLWLPL]H DQG
DVVHUWLQSUDFWLFHDQGLQODZDV\VWHPRILQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWVDWLV¿HVLWDWWKHPRPHQW
KRZHYHULWFDQERWKVWLPXODWHDQGLQKLELWJURZWK$GGLWLRQDOO\WKLVEHKDYLRULV
due to the possible opportunistic behavior of elites (or clans of the ruling elite) 
defending their position.
The double-vectored interests of the elites, who implement a positive program 
DQGPDLQWDLQWKHLUGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQFDQPDQLIHVWWKHPVHOYHVDVDGLUHFWFRQÀLFW
RUDVDWKUHDWRIVXFKFRQÀLFWLQWKHIXWXUH&RQVHTXHQWO\GHOD\VRFFXULQLPSOH-
menting reforms because of attempts by clans to calculate or adjust the measures 
RUODZVXQGHUGLVFXVVLRQWRPLQLPL]HRUUHPRYHIXWXUHWKUHDWV'HOD\VLQPDNLQJ
decisions to reform institutions may create additional problems for the institu-
tional system and affect the country’s development potential.
Substantive revision of property relations through revolutions and transforma-
WLRQVLVDQRWKHUGLI¿FXOWSUREOHPWKDWKDPSHUVWKHVXVWDLQDELOLW\RIHOLWHV¶ULJKWV
DQGVXSSRUWIRUWKHUXOHRIODZ(QRUPRXVEHQH¿WVIURPWKHVHL]XUHRISURSHUW\
outweigh both the moral code and the development interests. The coincidence 
of the elites’ interests and of economic development in the early transformation 
stages must be proved separately, at each stage. The reason is this transformation 
is not a long historical process of forming relations of property and distribution; 
instead, now the actors are well informed, understand their objectives and, more 
importantly, the brevity of the “open assets” period, that is, of the time span when 
there are wide opportunities for property seizure.
-%XFKDQDQRXWOLQHGWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHLQLWLDOSUREOHPRISURSHUW\ULJKWVDV
follows: “It is appropriate to call this a genuine basis for the emergence of pro-
SHUW\ULJKWV%RWKSDUWLHVDJUHHWRDQGDFFHSWWKHDVVLJQPHQWZKLFKFDUULHVZLWK
it the complementary agreement that they will not behave to violate the terms. 
7KHUHIRUHERWKSDUWLHVFDQUHGXFHWKHLUSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWLQDWWDFNDQGGHIHQVH
at the limit, the full value of X can be realized without cost. The agreement on 
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rights of the two parties represents a contractual internalization of an externality 
UHODWLRQVKLSWKDWH[LVWHGLQ WKHSUHFRQWUDFWVWDWHRIQDWXUH7KHVSHFL¿FGLVWUL-
EXWLRQRIULJKWVWKDWFRPHVLQWKHLQLWLDOOHDSIURPDQDUFK\LVGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWR
the relative commands over goods and the relative freedom of behavior enjoyed 
E\ WKHVHSDUDWH SHUVRQV LQ WKHSUHYLRXVO\ H[LVWLQJ QDWXUDO VWDWH´ %XFKDQDQ
1975, Ch. 2). Of course, the transformation of the property institution and of 
WKHSURSHUW\LWVHOIDSSHDUVYHU\GLIIHUHQW0RUHRYHULWLVGLI¿FXOWWRGLVWLQJXLVK
between social elements that created the rules and those which used them for 
privatization.4
'%URPOH\  LQWURGXFHG WKHFRQFHSWV RI FRPPRGLW\ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
transactions. The latter involves actions aimed at changing the “rules of the 
game” and not at the exchange of goods under the existing rules. It appears pro-
GXFWLYH WR H[SORUH LQ IXWXUH WKHIRUPDWLRQ RIPDUNHW LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG SULYDWH
property from that perspective. The new relations of property and its distribu-
tion in our time cannot emerge from simple relationships, by trial and error, or 
IURPOHJLWLPL]DWLRQRIDOHDSIURPFKDRV+HUHZHDUHGLVFXVVLQJWKH³UHIRUPHU´
which expresses the interests of the “principal,” who is capable of authorizing 
the establishment of the rules of transfer and use of property. It can be assumed 
that neither was aware of the consequences of their introduction in the long term; 
however, this problem has two aspects.
First, in Russia, the “principal” (who dictated the direction of reforms when 
power changed hands) was fully aware of the original objective, which was to 
form an elite group of owners, and authorized the establishment of rules with 
priority accorded to that objective (in other countries, different purposes were 
formulated).5 Second, both the “reformer” and the “principal” had all the re-
sources necessary to be aware at every step of the consequences of their activities 
DQGWRPDNHDGMXVWPHQWVZKHQHYHUWKH\ZDQWHGDQGEHOLHYHGLWQHFHVVDU\WRGR
so. Relevant topics of the demand for law are considered in a number of interest-
LQJZRUNVVHHIRULQVWDQFH3LVWRU+HQGOH\
The most important event for the contemporaries is the post-socialist trans-
IRUPDWLRQ RI SURSHUW\ DQG RI WKHPDUNHW HFRQRP\ DQG VRFLHW\ DV D ZKROH
S. Pejovich (1994) in his. article analyzed innovations in the institutional changes 
in the transformation process on the basis of competition among different rules. 
From the voluntary efforts and arrangements examples of “successes” and 
“failures ” emerge. The former (successes) are copied by other individuals and 
HYHQWXDOO\LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG$SSDUHQWO\WKLVEHKDYLRULVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKHRSWL
PLVWLFSHULRGRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ+RZHYHU¿UVWIRUWKHQDWXUDOSURFHVVRIVHOHF-
WLRQLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRFODULI\WKHDELOLW\RIWKHPDUNHWLQVWLWXWLRQVWRGLVWLQJXLVK
(very rapidly) between the successful arrangements and failures; second, there is 
no certainty a priori that the correct institutions will be selected for the purposes 
of long-term economic development.
 4 In Russia, in contrast to what one observes in Central and Eastern Europe, debates continue regarding 
the political nature of privatization; however, there have been practically no court trials over cases of abuse 
RILWVUXOHVFRQÀLFWVRILQWHUHVWRUPDQLSXODWLRQVRIYDOXHRURWKHUW\SLFDOSUREOHPVRISULYDWL]DWLRQDOWKRXJK
50,000–60,000 enterprises have been privatized.
 5 :HDUHDZDUHWKDWZHXVHWKHWHUP³SULQFLSDO´ZKLFKZHERUURZHGIURPDQHLJKERULQJ¿HOGRINQRZOHGJH
LQ WKHRU\ UXOHV UHÀHFW WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDFWRUV IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIDZDUHQHVVDQGSRZHUV LQFOXGLQJ
WKHULJKWWRWKH¿UVWPRYH
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In the natural selection of institutions’ process, certain actors who will intro-
duce innovations in contracts and arrangements must be present; next, they or 
WKHLUOLNHVZLOOFRS\WKLVRUWKDWDUUDQJHPHQW)LQDOO\WKHVHDFWRUVZLOOFRQVROL-
date the preferable types or interact solely through these, which the arrangement 
merely puts on record. The process of selection inevitably involves additional 
aspects: the interests of individuals who are active in innovation and in their 
copying and consolidation; the criterion (and horizon) of assessing the success 
or failure. One must consider two important factors: the factor of the evolu-
tion of groups’ and individuals’ interests at different stages of the process; and 
WKHJUDGXDOHPHUJHQFHRI LQÀXHQWLDO LQGLYLGXDOVRUJURXSVZKRDUHDSSDUHQWO\
³ZLQQHUV´RIWKH¿UVWVWDJHRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
This approach puts us in front of a chain of related events, in which the “winner ” 
RIWKHMXVWHQGHGVWDJHLVOLNHO\WRDWWHPSWWRFRQVROLGDWHWKHUXOHVWKDWDOORZHG
KLPWRZLQZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHWRFRQWLQXDOO\ZLQUHSHDWHGO\+RZHYHULWLVSRV-
VLEOHWKDWLIWKHJDLQLVVXI¿FLHQWO\ODUJHZKLFKPD\DOVREHGLI¿FXOWWRUHWDLQ
the “winner ” may opt for opportunistic behavior and may attempt to change 
WKHUXOHVWRZHDNHQFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHWRFRQVROLGDWHWKHJDLQVDQG
SUHYHQWWKHULVNRIORVVHVDQGRIFHGLQJSRVLWLRQV7KHVHOHFWLRQRILQVWLWXWLRQDO
arrangements can proceed in accordance with the general rule of success; how-
ever, this is not necessarily the best institution from the perspective of demo-
FUDF\ DQG HIIHFWLYHPDUNHWV7KHUHIRUH WKHQDWXUDO VHOHFWLRQ RI DUUDQJHPHQWV
GRHVQRWDOZD\VHQVXUHVXFFHVVIRUWKHVRFLHW\RUIRUWKHIRUPDWLRQRIDQHI¿FL
HQWPDUNHWV\VWHP
Interference by the “reformer” substantially alters the situation, but this re-
quires explanation. First, he must act in general long-term interests, which may 
QRWEHREVHUYHGLQUHDOLW\6HFRQGKHLVWREHYHU\NQRZOHGJHDEOHDQGYLVLRQDU\
including the ability to predict the formation of institutions and their interaction 
(which is not very easy). Instead, we shall assume that the “reformer” either im-
SRUWVDQLQVWLWXWLRQIURPWKHRXWVLGHDWWHPSWVWR¿QGLWLQWKHYROXQWDU\FKDRWLF
attempts and transactions, or has one’s own explicit or hidden agenda.
In the latter case, the selection of institutions may be an artifact. The “re-
IRUPHU¶V´ GRPDLQ DOVR LQFOXGHV WKHLVVXH RI WLPLQJ²EHIRUH VLPXOWDQHRXVO\
or after the beginning of massive transactions and contracts in the renewed in-
stitutional environment, and the problem of interests that are material or presti-
gious (power and glory) pushing him towards opportunism. Next, there must 
IROORZWKHFODVVL¿FDWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOVHQJDJHGLQWUDQVDFWLRQVDQGDUUDQJHPHQWV
ZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI³IXUWKHU´DFWLRQRUWKRVHZKRVWDUWIURPVFUDWFK)LQDOO\
WKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQUDLVHVWKHTXHVWLRQRIVRFLDOLQWHUHVWVWKHVWUDWL¿FDWLRQRIUH-
formers (including their transition to the group of owners), and changes in the in-
terests of players at each step.
5. Double-sector model of capital import–export
,QWKHLUDUWLFOH'$FHPRJOXHWDOFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLV
DVLJQL¿FDQWGHFOLQHLQWKH*'3RYHU¿YH\HDUVZRXOGXQGHUPLQHGLFWDWRUVKLSV
rather than democracies. Of course, this result was obtained on the basis of post-
ZDU SHULRG GDWD PDLQO\ UHÀHFWLQJ WKHUHDOLWLHV RI /DWLQ$PHULFD DQG WKHFRO-
lapse of the socialist system. Of course, the protection of property rights must 
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EHFDSDEOHRIPDLQWDLQLQJVXVWDLQDEOHLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVRYHUWLPH:HDN
protection of property generates huge “day-to-day protection” costs, and capital 
ÀLJKWLVDQDWXUDOUHDFWLRQWRWKUHDWV
We proceed from the rational behavior of a capitalist in a relatively open econo-
my (import–export of capital). When the investment climate changes, he attempts 
WRVXSSRUWPD[LPL]HWKHLQFRPHZKLOHPLQLPL]LQJWKHULVNV+RZHYHUWKHULVN
of property seizure by the state or by a raider, of a sudden change in the “rules 
RIWKHJDPH´DQGRIFRXUWSURVHFXWLRQLVQRWUHÀHFWHGE\DVLPSOHOLQHDUIXQF-
WLRQ:HEHOLHYHWKDWDEXVLQHVVPDQDWWHPSWVWRVLPXOWDQHRXVO\PD[LPL]HSUR¿WV
in Russia (at home) and to save money for the family and to conduct business 
DEURDGWKDWLVKHFUHDWHVDGRXEOHVHFWRUGXDOFRXQWU\FRPSDQ\$SRUWLRQRI
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWVUHPDLQLQ5XVVLDWRPD[LPL]HSUR¿WDPLGKLJKULVNVDQG
WKHRWKHU SRUWLRQ LV H[SRUWHG DEURDG DV ORZULVN FDSLWDO IRU WKHVDNHRI ³EHWWHU
buoyancy.” In our opinion, such a pattern of behavior is notably widespread in 
5XVVLDLQFOXGLQJWKHIRUHLJQEDQNDFFRXQWVRILQGLYLGXDOVDQGWKHSXUFKDVHVRI
ORZLQFRPHSURSHUW\LQ6SDLQDQG%XOJDULD+DYLQJHPEDUNHGRQWKHSDWKRIULVN
GLYHUVL¿FDWLRQWKHEXVLQHVVPDQZLOODXWRPDWLFDOO\UHGXFHWKHDPRXQWRILQYHVW-
ment at home, thereby increasing the cost of credit domestically and transferring 
savings from the country in the form of long-term, usually direct (partially liquid) 
investment.
7KLV IRUP RI ULVN RSWLPL]DWLRQ DQG DVVHW PDQDJHPHQW LV HVVHQWLDO IRU DQ\
PDFURHFRQRPLFPRGHOEHFDXVH¿UPVDQGLQGLYLGXDOVPDNHMXGJPHQWVRQWKHLU
RZQDQGDUH FDSDEOHRIPDNLQJGHFLVLRQV VXI¿FLHQWO\ HIIHFWLYH WKDWPD\FR-
incide or run counter to the intentions of the national monetary authorities. Of 
course, the point at issue is the magnitude of the problem; however, all capital 
export indicators point to its large size. In this case, it is necessary to consider 
WKHJURVVFDSLWDORXWÀRZLQ WKHPRGHODW WKHPLFUR OHYHO7KHLPSRUWRIFDSLWDO
DOWKRXJKLWLVSHUIRUPHGE\WKHVDPHDFWRUVLVFRQGXFWHGWRH[WUDFWKLJKSUR¿WV
under completely different (speculative) rules, although it may be part of the ac-
WRUV¶VDPHVWUDWHJ\RIEDODQFLQJULVNVDQGEHQH¿WV
)RU WKHDQDO\VLVRI LQGLYLGXDOFDSLWDOÀLJKWZHFDQSURSRVHWKHIROORZLQJ
PRGHO$EXVLQHVVPDQKDVFRQVLGHUDEOHDVVHWVZKLFKFDQEHSODFHGDWKRPHRU
DEURDG,QWKH¿UVWFDVHWKHUDWHRIUHWXUQDQGULVNVDUHPXFKKLJKHU7KHTXHV-
WLRQLVKRZWKHEXVLQHVVPDQHVWLPDWHVWKHULVNRIORVLQJWKHEXVLQHVVDWKRPH
over a period of T years: from pressures by the state, as a result of raiding, 
or from a sharp deterioration in the “rules of the game” (taxes or additional 
charges of “old taxes”). The businessman summarizes these probabilities into 
DULVNYDULDEOHIRUDJLYHQWLPHKRUL]RQ)URPWKHSUR¿WVUHFHLYHGDWKRPHDQG
offshore), the businessman deducts the full amount of payments to the shadow 
economy, which include latent business partners, pay for patronage and cor-
ruption-related costs. Naturally, although high domestic incomes compensate 
IRU DOO WKHULVNV DQG LOOHJLWLPDWH FRVWV DQG DV ORQJ DV WKHSURVSHFWV DSSHDU
more or less reliable, the businessman will continue to conduct business in 
5XVVLD+RZHYHU LQDGGLWLRQKHPD\VHHNWRUHORFDWHDQLQFUHDVLQJSURSRU-
WLRQ RI DVVHWV LQWR ORZULVN DUHDV IRU WKHVDNH RI KLV KHDOWK SURVSHULW\ DQG
IDPLO\VWDELOLW\1H[W WKHVXPRISUR¿WV LQ WKHGRPHVWLFVHFWLRQRI WKHFRP-
SDQ\ZKLFKLVGLVFRXQWHGIRUULVNVZLOOJUDGXDOO\GHFUHDVH2QHFDQLPDJLQH
the surge of uncertainty for a business when the discount rate increases sharply 
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DQG IRUHLJQ SUR¿WV DW D ORZ UDWH RI UHWXUQ EHFRPH VXI¿FLHQW WR RXWZHLJK
WKHGRPHVWLFSUR¿WV6
where Outcome (T) is the businessman’s discounted net income over a period of 
T years; Pfi LV WKHH[SHFWHG SUR¿W RI HDFK VHFWLRQ RI WKHFRPSDQ\ IURP DVVHWV
during the i period; h is the company’s domestic section; off is the company’s 
foreign section; ɌLVDULVNDVVHVVPHQWKRUL]RQLQ\HDUVCostdefi is the expected 
LQIRUPDOSD\PHQWVEULEHVIXQGLQJRISROLWLFDOSURMHFWV²SURWHFWLRQFRVWVGXULQJ
the i period; R = R (risk) = R (raid, grab, taxes²WKHGLVFRXQWUDWHZKHUHULVN
LVWKHDJJUHJDWHGULVNSDUDPHWHUUDLGJUDEWD[HVDUHWKHSUREDELOLWLHVRIH[SR-
VXUHWRDGYHUVHHIIHFWVLQFOXGLQJDQDWWDFNE\UDLGHUVIUDXGWKHIWH[WRUWLRQRUWD[
suits, respectively, in a given year (expressed as a decimal). 
Thus, we consider the return on assets at home and abroad, minus the direct 
FRVWVRISURWHFWLRQGLVFRXQWHGIRUWKHULVNRIFDSLWDO ORVV ODZVXLWVRUUDLGLQJLQ
the foreseeable future T. We subtract the “external return” solely for convenience; 
one can simply compare the two parts of the equation (divide one by the other). 
When the Outcome LQGLFDWRUEHFRPHVQHJDWLYHIRUHLJQSUR¿WVDOZD\VSRVLWLYH
DUH QRW VXI¿FLHQW WR FRYHU WKHH[SHFWHG ORVVHV DW KRPH7KLV ¿QGLQJ LV DPDMRU
reason for shifting the proportions of capital within the company in favor of off-
VKRUHDVVHWVUHGXFLQJFRVWVDWKRPHRUVLPSO\FHDVLQJULVN\GRPHVWLFRSHUDWLRQV
2IFRXUVHZHDUHDZDUHWKDWIRUWKHROLJDUFKVVXFKEHKDYLRULVGLI¿FXOWVLPSO\
because of the scale of capital, and many business people solve this problem 
KLJKO\GLIIHUHQWO\$QDOWHUQDWLYHVROXWLRQLVLQGLYLGXDOO\DFFHSWDEOHDWWKHPLFUR
OHYHOKRZHYHULWLVQRWFRQGXFLYHWRULVNWDNLQJLQQRYDWLRQRUWKHPRGHUQL]D-
tion of the country. We are discussing the merger of businesses with the authori-
ties (locally and above), deriving rents from the “closeness with the authorities,” 
RUUHFHLYLQJSURWHFWLRQLQH[FKDQJHIRU¿QDQFLQJXVXDOO\KLGGHQDFFRPSOLFHV
and large non-business expenses (which, incidentally, can eventually become 
a matter for a lawsuit). In addition, the merger with the authorities is a deli-
cate and selective affair; most businesses, as the large-scale corruption scandals 
VKRZSD\IRUSDWURQDJHWKLVSXWVWKHEXVLQHVVHVLQWKHSRVLWLRQRIDODZEUHDNHU
Therefore, these businesses cannot guarantee immunity from prosecution and 
RWKHU ULVNV SDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQ WKHSROLWLFDO UHJLPHKDV FKDQJHG WKHGHPRFUDF\
begins to spread, or a “clean hands” crusade is launched.
6. “Overcrowded streetcar effect” and the behavior of elites
We can now return to the “overcrowded streetcar effect” and the behavior of 
elites. We believe that after the end of a certain period of “roving bandits and 
UREEHU EDURQV´ RI FRXUVH WKHGXUDWLRQ RI WKLV SHULRG GHSHQGV RQ WKHVSHFL¿F
 6 1DWXUDOO\LQWKHJLYHQSRVWFULVLVSHULRGLQWHUHVWUDWHVDURXQGWKHZRUOGDUHORZDVLVWKHSUR¿WUDWHDEURDG
$QXSWXUQLQ$VLDRUDODWHUXSWXUQLQWKH(8DQGWKH86PD\FDXVHWKHSUR¿WDELOLW\RIFDSLWDOH[SRUWWRVKLIW
LQWKHFRQWH[WRIORZHUULVNVDWKRPHRQWKHFRQGLWLRQRIDFHUWDLQFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHPRGHO¶VSDUDPHWHUV
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KLVWRULFDO DQG QDWLRQDO IHDWXUHV WKH¿QDQFLDO HOLWH WDNHV FRQWURO RI NH\ DVVHWV
(including the post-Soviet assets) and needs the protection of its domain, which 
LV LWVEDVHRIUHJXODURSHUDWLRQV WRDIDUJUHDWHUGHJUHHWKDQQHZFRQÀLFWVDQG
SURSHUW\VHL]XUHV0RUHSUHFLVHO\VHL]XUHVFDQQRZEHWUDQVIHUUHGWR WKHVWRFN
exchange and conducted by means of collusion, which is how it is achieved in 
the “happy world” of legal capitalism, which is the world of XX century tycoons 
LQGHYHORSHGGHPRFUDFLHVWKDWLVVWDWHVUXOHGE\ODZVHH'H/RQJ
One can imagine how the elite, once inside an “overcrowded streetcar” closes 
WKHGRRUVWKDWLVEORFNVDGPLVVLRQWRWKHHOLWHWKURXJKWKHVWDWHRUWKURXJKDQ\DS-
parent violations of the rules of a legal state. Renunciation of business seizures or of 
DUWL¿FLDOFULPLQDOL]DWLRQLVDFFRPSDQLHGE\ERWKLPSURYHPHQWVLQHFRQRPLFOHJLV-
lation (a better investment climate de jure) and a sharp improvement in the practice 
of law enforcement (a better investment climate de facto). Of course, this should 
also apply to large companies and holdings and to the middle and small businesses 
at the regional level. This is the natural outcome of the period of massive redistri-
bution of assets of the 1990s, based on rules of the past very far removed from any 
justice, and, particularly, from the logic of establishing the domination of effective 
HFRQRPLFHQWLWLHV VHH*ULJRU\HYE+RZHYHUZHEHOLHYH WKDW WKLV WUDQVL-
tion is inevitable from the historical perspective, and the establishment of pro-
perty rights protection and the creation of conditions for investment and growth in 
5XVVLDGHSHQGRQKRZTXLFNO\DQGKRZUDGLFDOO\DEDQZLOOEHLPSRVHGRQXQGHU-
mining someone else’s business and on collecting bribes from those who remain 
unprotected outside the “streetcar.” We believe the passengers on the “streetcar” 
will be pardoned directly or indirectly by all existing means; the legitimacy of all 
past actions will be ensured by the former “barons” turned responsible owners and 
the engines of the progress and modernization of the country.
+RZHYHUWRFORVHWKHGRRUVRIWKH³VWUHHWFDU´DQGWRHVWDEOLVKDFRPPRQOHJDO
IUDPHZRUNLWZLOOEHQHFHVVDU\WRVROYHVHYHUDOGLI¿FXOWSUREOHPV
x establish and enforce the standard for those who remain in the street and for all 
who would board the “streetcar”;
x achieve consensus among its passengers;
x XOWLPDWHO\³FORVHWKHGRRUV´DQGEORFNDWWHPSWVE\WKHRXWVLGHUVWRPDNHWKHLU
way inside;
x VDFUL¿FHXQKRRNSDUWRIWKHZDJRQV³WROHWWKHVWUHHWFDU¿QDOO\JHWUROOLQJ´
x those remaining “on the street” should be aware that: a) the “streetcar” has 
departed, b) there is no longer any chance to board it, and c) there are general 
rules of upward mobility;
x HQVXUHWKDWWKHNH\LQÀXHQWLDODFWRUVKDYHDFFHSWHGWKLV¿QDO reform of the pro-
tracted process of ownership transformation (the problem of external legiti-
macy).
,QGLVFXVVLQJSRVVLEOHUHIRUPVLQWKHF\FOHRI$6KDVWLWNRSUHVHQWHGWR
reformers (in our interpretation of the term) a request to change institutions; in fact, 
he did that with consent from the elites, assuming their determination to support 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW+RZHYHU WKHUHDUHFHUWDLQ VHULRXV UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU
the very organization of institutional restructuring in later stages: “The choice of 
a technology for the systematic modernization of institutions is rather an exception 
WKDQWKHUXOH$FRQ¿UPDWLRQRIWKLVLVREVHUYHGQRWRQO\LQWKHHFRQRPLFKLVWRU\RI
the past two decades, but in the relation between strategies from the  perspective of 
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WKHSUREDELOLW\RILPSOHPHQWLQJWKHP$UHSUREDELOLWLHVH[RJHQRXV"´6KDVWLWNR
2008). The determination of the authorities (the ruling elite) to change the “rules 
of the game” in spite of the inevitable violation of certain interests is an important 
aspect of the situation.
Regarding the role of elites in the creation of the “limited access order,” Nobel 
ODXUHDWH'1RUWKHWDOSQRWH³2XUSDUDGLJPSD\VPRUHDWWHQWLRQWR
matters of violence and organizational structures inside elites.” In fact, the issue 
being discussed is that of reducing violence and facilitating access for different 
VWUDWDRIVRFLHW\WRWKHSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFOLIH:KDWPDNHVWKLVDSSURDFK
so important is that developing societies “reduce violence through manipulations 
by the political system with the aim to create rents that let groups with access to 
YLROHQFHDQGLQGLYLGXDOVUHDOL]HWKHEHQH¿WVRIUHIUDLQLQJIURPYLROHQFH´1RUWK
et al., 2012,  p. 8). In fact, this is the inverse problem: the offer of an amnesty and 
rent to the elite “passengers of the streetcar” to purchase from them the maxi-
mum freedom of access for society.
2XUQH[WUHPDUNFRQFHUQVWKHPRGHRIDFWLRQWKHHOLWHVPD\FKRRVHWRPDLQ-
tain their position, particularly by means of violence, including the division and 
extraction of higher rents as a result of an agreement between the “leaders of 
DUPHGJURXSV´LQFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHFRQÀLFW:HPXVWDGGWKDWDQH[WHUQDO
guarantor is needed to maintain the fragile political arrangements among groups 
that distrust each other. The elites’ leaders calculate scenarios for long periods 
and may consider such an agreement a truce, which is needed to gain strength 
EHIRUHDQLQHYLWDEOHIXWXUHFRQÀLFW7KHKLJKFRVWVRIVXUYLYDORIWKHHOLWHJURXSV
DQGWKHDVVRFLDWHGULVNVPD\EHPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKHUDWLRQDOFDOFXODWLRQRI
UHQWVRIWKH³VWDWLRQDU\´VRWRVSHDNPLOLWDU\OHDGHUV7
)LQDOO\WKHDXWKRUVFRQFOXGH³$WWKHOHYHORIWKHHOLWHVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUH-
sult will be growing certainty that the supremacy of law for the elites will be im-
plemented impartially and there will eventually emerge institutions where the at-
titude to elites will be fair and impersonal, i.e., an ever wider range of the elites 
will be living by the same rules” (North et al., 2012,  p. 15). Thus, this is a pro-
PLVHRIDQLPSDUWLDOWULDOLQ7KH+DJXH"RIFHUWDLQHOHPHQWVRIWKHHOLWH
In this paper, we have attempted to show that the ruling elites of many count ries 
need to move to the legal solutions of problems for the country as a whole; other-
wise, there is a threat both to its development and to their position in the country 
in the long run. We believe that the elites become “stationary” and want to maxi-
PL]HWKHWLPHRIWKHLUSUHVHQFHDWWKHWRSRISROLWLFV¿QDQFHDQGVRFLHW\1RUWK
and his colleagues address a different problem: how to persuade the “failed” 
( ineffective) elites to retire on the proposed terms and expand citizens ’ access to 
political and economic life?8
For us, this is a great topic of research; the doors of the “streetcar” are open 
ZLGHIRUWKHYROXQWDU\H[LWRISDVVHQJHUVRUIRUWKHIUHHVWSRVVLEOHÀRZRISDV-
sengers between the crowd inside and the “queue at the stop.” We believe this 
behavior applies to different stages of development and to different situations: 
 7 7KHSHUVRQDO SOLJKW RI WKHOHDGHUV RXVWHG LQ WKHFRXUVH RI WKH³$UDE VSULQJ´ RI ± LV QRW YHU\
encouraging for potential leaders who wish to give up power (violence) in exchange for a rent and calm.
 8 $QH[DPSOHRIDQXQVXFFHVVIXODWWHPSWWR³SHUVXDGH´WKH$UDEHOLWHVWRDJUHHWRDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLVGLVFXVVHG
in Perthes (2004).
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LQFHUWDLQSODFHVWKHHOLWHPD\EHJLQWRGLVHPEDUNDQGLQRWKHUVLQFRQWUDVWWR
become stronger and adapt. The ruling elite’s abdication from overt control can 
be forcible under the pressures of public protests.
$ GHVFULSWLRQ RI VXGGHQ XSFRPLQJ H[WHUQDO FKDQJHV LV EH\RQG RXU WDVN
the purpose of this paper is to analyze the behavior of elites, who are already 
LQVLGHWKH³VWUHHWFDU´2QHFDQRIIHUDQRWKHULOOXVWUDWLYHPRGHORIULVNVWKHHOLWH¶V
presence inside the “streetcar” with open doors encounters: one may fall out, as 
North et al. (2012) noted. It appears that many of the elements of the elite within 
the “streetcar” are aware of that; occasionally business and intellectual elite re-
presentatives call for establishing law and order in a particular country.
We believe that several factors can interfere with the closing of the “streetcar” 
GRRUV DQGZLWK LQWURGXFLQJ GLI¿FXOW UXOHV FRPSOLDQFHZLWK ODZV IRU DOOZKR
have remained outside, that is, for all businesses, bureaucracy, etc. First, there is 
continued pressure from various “friendly” sub-elites and hypo-elites, who are 
attempting to extend the “open season for the redistribution of assets” to catch 
the “streetcar” (or to attach another carriage to it) while the doors remain open. 
These elites and a number of passengers occasionally have an idea of laying 
hands on and sharing the assets of a passenger or a group outside to create their 
RZQJUHDWIRUWXQHV6HFRQGWKHUHDUHFRPSOH[UHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQWKH¿QDQFLDO
and political elites who have not yet decided the question of the nature and com-
position of the ruling elite. Third, there is a continuing struggle of clans in con-
nection with the discussion of policy issues of combining two things: the nature 
of the country’s development and, at the same, continued control (see Grigoryev, 
2010a). Fourth, there is an unresolved problem of the legitimacy of property and 
security, that is, mutual guarantees by the elites and society that the rule of law 
enjoys supremacy (in fact, an amnesty for past violations in seizing assets).
In particular, the passengers of the “elite streetcar” need the certainty that these 
institutional changes, which are very positive from the perspective of the count-
ry’s development, are reliable and will remain as such for a long time; in addition, 
XQH[SHFWHGIXWXUHFKDQJHVZLOOQRWDIIHFWWKHEXONRIWKHSDVVHQJHUV9 Typically, 
the ruling elites are not prepared to accept the idea of losing control in exchange 
for impartiality and rent (a type of an elite retirement pension). The determination 
WRIHQGRIIWKRVHVXSSRUWHUVRULQÀXHQWLDOPHPEHUVRIWKHFRPSHWLQJHOLWHVZKR
also want to board the “streetcar” or to attach a couple of carriages to it is also 
a matter of political courage and wisdom of the ruling elite. The elite’s expressed 
and enforced demand for the rule of law is a long-term choice of a course toward 
the stability of society and the elite’s proper position.
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